

The new fiscal responsibility in Slovakia

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The new fiscal responsibility in Slovakia



I. Background

- SK & EU public deficits and debts
- EU anti-crisis measures

II. Fiscal Responsibility A ct

- Major goals
- Basic pillars


III. Conclusion




I. Background Slovak and EU-27 public deficits and debts 1 of 2



The development of gross domestic product and general government deficit




Crisis hit and surprised the established budgets




I. Background Slovak and EU-27 public deficits and debts 2 of 2



The development of general government gross debt



EU started addressing a problem of debt growth.
EU is implementing the series of rescue measures and guarantees



I. Background EU anti-crisis measures for fiscal policy



What did propose the European Union in the 2011?

The area of fiscal policy

Amendments to the Stability and Growth Pact

Defining a minimum requirements for national fiscal frameworks

Slovak government initiated a fiscal framework reform



I. Background



I. The fiscal framework reform in Slovakia is compatible with EU initiatives concerning crisis management


- **II. Fiscal Responsibility Act**
 - Major goals
 - Basic pillars


III. Conclusion



II. Fiscal Responsibility Act Major goals







II. Fiscal Responsibility Act The basic pillars



Which are the basic pillars of Fiscal Reponsibility Act?

Fiscal Responsibility Council


Transparency rules

Tighter rules for local governments

Aggregate nominal expenditure ceilings

Upper limit on general government gross debt

Emphasis on country's net worth



II. Fiscal Responsibility Act I. Pillar – Fiscal Responsibility Council



Competencies

Fiscal Responsibility Council

Roles

Drawing up & publishing

Report on the long-term sustainability

Evaluation report on the fulfilment of fiscal responsibility and transparency rules

Opinions on the legislative proposals

Other activities

Evaluating

Economic development

Fiscal responsibility rules



II. Fiscal Responsibility Act I. Pillar – Example 1 of 2



Report on the long-term sustainability

Long-term sustainability indicator =

X = current value of structural primary general government balance

Y = required value of structural primary general government balance

Detailed methodology is published by
Fiscal Responsibility Council
before issuing a report on the long-term sustainability.



II. Fiscal Responsibility Act 1st pillar – Example 2 of 2




Development of long-term sustainability indicator

Slovakia in 2008 to n + x



Natural long-term sustainability = 0



II. Fiscal Responsibility Act 2nd pillar – Transparency rules



Data publishing

The general government entities

Budgetary data


to publish 30 days after budget approval

to publish 60 days after the end of budgetary year

The Ministry of Finance

- Macro-economic forecast
- Tax revenue and social contributions forecast

to publish before February 15 & June 30



II. Fiscal Responsibility Act 3rd pillar – The tighter rules for local governments



The main rules for municipalities and higher territorial units

State budget

- 1. Zero participation in ensuring a solvency
- 2. Only for new roles within the legislative changes

3. Total debt > 60 % GDP

Penalty imposed by Ministry off inance

Penalty = 5% of (A - B)

A = total debt

B = 60 % actual revenues of previous budgetary year



II. Fiscal Responsibility Act 4th pillar – Aggregate nominal expenditure ceilings



Fiscal rule for government 3-year basis

Aggregate nominal expenditure ceilings

Ensuring

Long-term sustainability

Acceptable general government gross debt ratio

The procedure for determining the expenditure ceilings is established by an act



II. Fiscal Responsibility Act 5th pillar – Upper limit on general government debt 1 of 2

2 FRECHVILLS

Upper limit on general government debt = 60 % of GDP until 2017

What happens until 2017 when the debt is

50 %	>	53 %
53 %	>	55 %
55 %	>	57 %
57 %	>	60 %
60 %	>	60+ %

Automatical political sanctions

There are possibilities for the government to defend its position vs sanctions



II. Fiscal Responsibility Act 5th pillar – Upper limit on general government debt 2 of 2

PARSIMODUS EFFECTIVITYS

Upper limit on general government debt = 50 % of GDP after 2017

What happens after 2017 when the debt is

40 %	> 43 %
43 %	> 45 %
45 %	> 47 %
47 %	> 50 %
50 %	> 50+ %

Automatical political sanctions

There are possibilities for the government to defend its position vs sanctions



II. Fiscal Responsibility Act 6th pillar – Emphasis on state's net worth



Calculation and goals

State's net worth = A - L

A = total assets of public sector balance

L = total liabilities of public sector balance

Benchmark for transparency

Starting point for expenditure ceilings



II. Fiscal Responsibility Act 6th pillar – Example 1 of 3



The simplified general government balance

Assets	Liabilities	
A1 Buildings	L1 Explicit debt	
A2 Infrastructure	L2 Implicit debt	
A3 Capital stock	L3 Contingent debt	
A4 Deposits	L4 Other liabilities	
A5 Net worth of the Central Bank		
A6 Net worth of the state enterprises		
A7 Natural resources	Net Worth	
A8 Ecological worth		
A9 Other assets		



II. Fiscal Responsibility Act 6th pillar – Example 2 of 3




Government privatized

State-owned enterprise for

actual price (Y)

half price (1/2 Y)

reduced debt





II. Fiscal Responsibility Act 6th pillar – Example 3 of 3




Government mines

natural resource

revenues (Y)

deposits into funds

finances expenditures





II. Fiscal Responsibility Act



I. The fiscal framework reform in Slovakia is compatible with EU initiatives concerning crisis management

II. New act is liable towards future generation and has a counter-cyclical effect

III. Conclusion



III. Conclusion



Fiscal Responsibility Act is built to penalise irresponsible budgetary conduct as follows:

Informing the public about covert or cryptic deficits and debts

revealing reputational costs as long as the Government's failing to accomplish its own objectives

applying pre-agreed polical sanctions, if the country's debt is approaching or exceeding a critical value



III. Conclusion



Thank you for your attention Nacybo 3a Baue Bhnnahne